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There is a breadth of interest, a vastness and a daring in the work of the great men of the past, which cannot fail to give strength to their far removed descendants. One unconsciously becomes catholic by consulting them. I commend this book. It is rare good fortune to have so satisfactory an approach to such an ancient mine of learning.

ERNEST CARROLL MOORE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

Philosophia Militans. Gegen Klerikalismus und Naturalismus. Fünf Abhandlungen. Von FRIEDRICH PAULSEN. Berlin, Reuther und Reichard, 1901.—pp. viii, 192.

This is a collection of five able and interesting essays. The first, *Das jüngste Ketzengericht über die moderne Philosophie*, was called forth by Willmann's *Geschichte des Idealismus*, and was originally published in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, August, 1898. The second, *Kant der Philosoph des Protestantismus*, first appeared in Vaihinger's *Kantstudien*, in 1899. The third is a discussion of Hertling's work, *Das Prinzip des Katholicismus und die Wissenschaft*, and was printed in *Deutsche Stimmen*, September, 1899. The fourth, *Ein Gedenkblatt zu Fichte's Atheismusstreit*, appeared in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, April, 1899, and the last, *Ernst Haeckel als Philosoph*, came out in the *Preussische Jahresbücher*, July, 1900.

These essays have a common aim: the defence of modern idealistic philosophy against two powerful foes, clericalism and naturalism. Kant is the center of the attack, because he has annihilated both dogmatic supernaturalism and dogmatic naturalism. He has cut the very ground from under the feet of materialism, and has destroyed the supports of rational, philosophizing theology in human reason. In following Kant, modern philosophy repudiates the materialism of natural science, on the one hand, and the rationalism of theology, on the other, and renders unto science the things that are science's and unto religion the things that are of religion.

I suppose all but ecclesiastical philosophers will heartily agree with the principles laid down in the first four of these essays. The battle between scholasticism and free investigation has been fought, and the fruits of the victory won by science and philosophy will not be lost. The ideal of philosophy is the free pursuit of the truth, unhindered by external authority, and no one can really lay claim to being a philosopher who accepts any other ideal. The scholastic ecclesiastical ideal was a different one. The orthodox schoolman regarded it as his function to prove, so far as possible, the dogmas of the church; according to him the truth was already found. Thomas Aquinas believed in two sources of truth, human reason and divine revelation. But human reason cannot understand and demonstrate all truths; some of the dogmas are above reason (supra-rational), not against reason, and these dogmas are matters of faith. Reason is employed to support faith, and faith is called upon to confirm the reason. But faith is the guide and final judge, meaning by faith, faith in the dogmas

promulgated by the church. This is the position taken by the Catholic church and its philosophers to-day. Reason is subordinated to faith in the dogmas of the church. There can be no real disagreement between faith and reason ; wherever such a conflict appears it is not a conflict between faith and reason, but between faith and foolish opinion. The Catholic church, the Pope at Rome, is the highest and last authority ; the Catholic thinker is free to explore the territory of knowledge so long as he does not find anything contradictory of the dogma. Indeed, he cannot find anything that really contradicts the dogma, the mere fact that a proposition contradicts the dogma proves that it is wrong. *Extra ecclesiam nulla veritas*. Professor Paulsen is right in buckling on his armor and giving battle to this conception. We cannot accept the Catholic church or any other human institution as our ultimate authority in science and philosophy, and to contract beforehand not to discover anything not acceptable to the ecclesiastical authorities means death to knowledge and its progress. This is amply shown by the backwardness of Catholic science, a fact which has been deplored by Catholics themselves, though they are sometimes forced by the authorities to regret even their regrets. Professor Paulsen is right, "the climate of infallibility is not conducive to scientific research." "Between the principle of free research and absolute scholastic authority lies an impassable gulf. Whoever recognizes an absolute authority of this kind, for him there is no domain exempt from the direct or indirect influence of canonical decrees."

This semi-rationalism of the church was one of the chief objects against which the Reformation—for which nominalism and mysticism had paved the way—directed its attacks. Luther repudiated scholasticism and its attempt to prove the articles of faith. And Kant drew the logical consequences of the Protestant movement,—which, it is true, fell back again into rationalistic dogmatism after it came into power,—and may therefore be called the philosopher of Protestantism. In opposition to the church, Kant insists upon the autonomy of reason : reason is the final arbiter of what is true and false. This principle is indeed, as Professor Paulsen declares, the Magna Charta of Protestantism. Kant is also anti dogmatic. Reason cannot transcend the limits of human experience ; hence a rational theology in the old sense is absolutely impossible. Belief in God is an immediate moral certainty, however ; it is based upon our practical reason, upon the human will.

The recent remarkable spread of Catholicism and its mode of thought, Professor Paulsen explains as follows : Our age is characterized by a belief in power and by a lack of faith in *ideas*. The absolutism of the Catholic church inspires a respect among all who are opposed to political, religious, and intellectual anarchy. The infallible Pope now governs not only the church with its priesthood and monastic orders, but he also exercises an unusual influence over the thoughts of the laymen. The system of St. Thomas is the official philosophy of the church, while Protestantism is split

up into a host of opposing philosophical schools. Still, Professor Paulsen does not believe in the ultimate triumph of Catholicism. "The belief in power may for a time show an alarming growth ; militarism and mammonism will have their day ; according to the law of periodicity of historical life, the climax will be passed. The belief in ideas will again assert itself, the belief in external authority, after having culminated in the declaration of the infallibility of the Pope, will decline. Then Kant will again arise as the legitimate leader, for faith in ideas is the very heart of his philosophy, faith in freedom, truth, and justice, faith in the good, faith in reason as such."

After having defended philosophy against the attacks of the clericals who accuse it of undermining religion, Professor Paulsen turns his attention to the natural scientists who accuse it of despising science and promoting superstition. He takes up Haeckel's recent book, *Die Welträtsel*, and subjects it to a scathing criticism. Haeckel's work, he thinks, has no philosophical value whatever, but it deserves attention as a sign of the times. It represents the opinion of many natural scientists, who are not always as brave and honest as Haeckel in saying what they think. It shows what confusion reigns in the heads of men who have never made a serious study of anything but natural science, and that it is just as presumptuous for a biologist who has not studied philosophy to set himself up as an authority in this field, as it is for one ignorant of biology to offer suggestions to those who devote their energy to the examination of the phenomena of life. To Haeckel the biologist Professor Paulsen is ready to give respectful hearing ; Haeckel the philosopher he rejects as a narrow-minded and dogmatic tyro, whose philosophy consists of nothing but negations. None of the sciences, except the natural sciences, Haeckel thinks, has made progress since the Middle Ages, and the problem of the present, therefore, is to create a new philosophy, which will take the place of that abstract and largely metaphysical science which is taught at our universities as philosophy. This philosophy he proceeds to create, and a curious creation it certainly is. I cannot much blame Paulsen, who is noted for his undogmatic temper, for flaring up and flying at the throat of Haeckel, after reading the latter's book. If Haeckel's production proves anything it proves how necessary it is to keep the fires of philosophy burning, and that to ignore philosophy means to fall back into the exploded errors of the past. There is only one corrective for such phenomena as Haeckel's *Welträtsel*, and that is an earnest study of the history of philosophy. The metaphysical conceptions of persons untrained in the philosophical branches are about on a level with the notions of persons who have never taken a course in physics, and who attempt to work out their theories independently of what has already been accomplished. If a man should ignore the results of physical science and try to do without help what it has taken the race several thousand years to do, he would make the same impression upon physicists which Haeckel's 'new philosophy' makes upon persons

who are familiar with the history of philosophy. Had the book been written by a man of less renown in his own field than Haeckel, it would not have received much attention or had any influence. But the standing of its author as a biologist, and the fact that a lot of smaller men have for years been incoherently muttering the views which this book boldly proclaims, makes it worthy of the attention which Professor Paulsen gives it.

FRANK THILLY.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

The Doctrine of the Will in Fichte's Philosophy. By JOHN FRANKLIN BROWN. [A Thesis presented to the Faculty of Cornell University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.] Richmond, Ind., Cullaton and Co., 1900.—pp. 105.

In this book the author presents a study of Fichte's doctrine of freedom and a criticism of the same. He finds that the key to the great idealist's entire philosophical system is to be found in the words 'unity' and 'freedom,' that Fichte's craving for logical consistency led him to monism, and the demands of his intensely moral nature caused him to accept individual freedom, conceptions which as held by him are contradictory. In his psychological analysis, Fichte finds the essential nature of consciousness in activity, in will, as modern psychology does. "He does not believe in the existence of an Ego-in-itself, of a self apart from all conscious states; nor would he, on the other hand, resolve the self into either discrete mental states or a stream of consciousness. Rather would he say that the self is the persistent activity which is in all conscious states, but which is more than they. In so far, then, his psychology provides for a real individual self-hood, a personality, which is the only guarantee of individual freedom such as he describes." In his monistic metaphysics, however, the case for freedom is not so satisfactory. If we take monism seriously, and make the individual a manifestation of the absolute, it is hard to see how individual freedom is possible. If we regard the absolute as being resolved into the non-ego and the individual egos, we may perhaps retain individual freedom, but we lose the personality of the absolute and get pluralism. "It is," says Dr. Brown, "avowedly on ethical, or, as Fichte says, practical grounds that he decides in favor of freedom. The appearance of freedom in consciousness might conceivably be shown to be mere appearance. Disregarding ethical considerations, the reality of freedom corresponding to the appearance of it, can be neither proven nor disproven. The necessary consciousness of man that he has power over nature and over himself, that he is capable of vice and virtue, and conscious of opportunity and responsibility, that he has within himself the power to change the natural order of things,—this consciousness of his own peculiar dignity, as man, is the deciding factor in favor of freedom. It is not absolute demonstration, but it gives ground for a rational faith in the reality of that freedom for which man as moral most earnestly longs."